Main Arguments For Skepticism:1
Today, many people are skeptical regarding many issues, especially in reference to God and morality. Doubt is the
weapon of choice and some use arguments to support a skeptical approach. Following are three of the main arguments
used to justify skepticism and incourage doubt regarding what we know.

 

  1. Argument from error: Since we have been wrong in the past, we might be wrong now.

Everyone one has, at one time or another, been wrong about what she believes. For instance, Becky believes that
she sees Jane walking down an aisle in the store and goes over to say “Hi” only to find out that it is not Jane.
Since everyone has been wrong on many occasions in the past, it is possible that we are wrong about other things
we believe. Since it is possible that we are wrong in what we believe, we cannot legitimately say that we “know”
anything. Thus, the skeptic often responds to claims of knowledge by saying something like, “But isn’t it possible
you are wrong?” Once the other person agrees to this the skeptic has, seemingly, proven her position and defeated
the opposing view.

  1. Brain-in-a-vat argument: It is possible that we are simply brains in a vat and not really living the lives we believe we are living.

This argument has been around for a long time and comes in different forms. Another common form is the Evil
Demon argument. Either version has the same basic conclusion: it is possible we are not living the lives we think we
are living. The argument proceeds like this: it is possible that we are nothing more than brains-in-a-vat with a mad
doctor manipulating what we experience (think of the Matrix series of movies). This being the case, we are actually
wrong about everything we believe since we are not really experiencing what we think we are. The Evil Demon
argument is similar. The difference is simply that a demon has control of our minds and is manipulating our thoughts
so that we think we are experiencing certain things but, in fact, we are not.

  1. Transferring justification: even if we are right about our present experiences that does not mean we are right about things
    outside of our present experiences.

For instance, the skeptic may grant that we can have knowledge regarding certain sensory experiences (like seeing
a brown dog). However, this does not mean that we are also justified in believing that the same brown dog is still
alive an hour later (for it may have been killed by a car, died, simply ceased to exist, etc.). Therefore, the only
knowledge one has is that which is available to the person at the present moment.


A Critique of the Main Arguments For Skepticism:

  1. Argument from error: we might be wrong.

It is true that for any given belief one might be wrong. But this is hardly the entire story. Could it not also be said that
one might be right? To say that one might be wrong actually makes little progress (because, as noted, the
person might be right). To advance the argument (to actually make progress in the discussion) one needs to go beyond
this simple claim.

For example, if the skeptic were to ask the theist if he might be wrong about God’s existence the theist can safely
answer “yes” without any real threat to theism. To see why this is so one need only ask, “What follows from the point
that the theist ‘might’ be wrong?” Nothing follows from this point. This is because the converse is equally true,
namely, the theist might be right. The theist can ask the atheist the same question, “Is it possible that you are wrong?”
To be consistent and honest the atheist must say “yes.” But does this prove theism? No. Does this disprove atheism?
No. More is necessary than this simple question.

At this point the discussion is at an intellectual stalemate, which is neither support for nor against belief in God. What
this provides support for is the need to find out which view enjoys the best support (or, more appropriately, which view
is more likely than its converse). If one of these two options has more compelling support in its favor, then one
would be (prima facie ) justified to believe it. In other words, if theism has more compelling evidence (in the form
of arguments, historical support, etc.) in its favor then one is, at least initially, justified in believing that God does exist.
Conversely, if atheism has more compelling evidence (in the form of arguments, support, etc.) in its favor then
one is, at least initially, justified in believing that God does not exist. But note that the issue does not revolve around
if one “might” be right. Rather, it revolves around which view enjoys the best support. This puts the skeptic in the
position of having both to think through and to draw a conclusion, something many skeptics seem to resist.


This being the case, arguments for God’s existence (ontological, axiological, teleological, historical support, Biblical
support, etc.) all weigh in to provide good reasons to hold to theism. The skeptic would need to get beyond merely
“you might be wrong” and provide sound reasons for rejecting theism. In other words, the skeptic has a burden of
proof too. The challenge “you might be wrong” can hardly be considered as evidence against theism.

Might – Logical and Epistemic:
What is happening in this scenario is that the skeptic is using might in a way different than others usually use it. When the
skeptic claims that you might be wrong she is using the logical might. That is to say, it is logically possible that you
are wrong. In other words, the possibility exists (logically speaking) that you are in error. For instance, if one were to say
that China has the largest population of any country it would be logically possible to also say that China might not have
the largest population. That is, it is logically possible that another country has the largest population. This is because
the logical might is basically considering all possible options and is not designed to draw a conclusion at this point. Rather,
the logical might is useful for finding out all of the necessary information so that a properly informed conclusion can
be drawn. This leads us to the epistemic might.

Another use of might is the epistemic might (epistemic basically means "involving knowledge"). This means that there is
good reason(s) to believe that one view is right/wrong. If one asserts that Cameroon, Africa is the most populated
country in the world it could be reasonably said that this is wrong due to good evidence (namely, national census data
shows Cameroon is a country of only a few million while similar census data shows China is a country of a several billion).
Thus, the belief that Cameroon, Africa is the most populated country runs into problems.

The logical might is used to explore all possible options. The epistemic might is used to draw a conclusion (accept one
view and reject others) based on quality support. Here is a comparison between these two might's:

 

  Logical Might Epistemic Might
1
Two (or more) views considered “possibly” correct/incorrect
Evidence suggests one view is correct
2
Evidence not necessary to state
any view
Evidence necessary to state view
3
All views on equal standing
Evidence only allows one view to be considered true (opposing view not supported as well, if at all)
4
All views can be stated without contradiction
All views cannot be stated without contradiction [evidence supports one view over others]
5
Conclusion not possible
[if left here]
Conclusion possible

Notice that the logical might presents no problem in asserting either side of a view. One can rationally state both “China
might be the most populous nation on earth” and “China might not be the most populous nation on earth.” Both of these
assertions can be made without contradiction because both assertions are, technically, possible. However, this is all that
can be said at this point using the logical might. It is when proper supporting factors are considered that one moves to
the epistemic might. Once the evidence is weighed (census of both nations shows that Cameroon has a population of
approx. 16 million while China has a whopping population of a approx. 1.3 billion), one of the positions is usually seen
as more plausible or supported than the other (or others).

The epistemic might is very useful for discovering good grounds for accepting or rejecting a belief. To linger in the arena
of the logical might is to confuse possibilities with actual facts. It is necessary to move from the logical might to the
epistemic might by considering all relevant data/evidence.

Hidden in the skeptical view is the belief that, in order for one to have knowledge on a particular issue there must be
complete certainty. That is to say in order for one to know something is true there must be absolute certainty about the
belief with no possibility for it to be wrong. This is simply false. There is often the “possibility” of being wrong (logical might)
when one is in fact correct. The evidence is used to decide which view is correct. Even if one is wrong at times, and this
happens often, it is not valid to conclude that knowledge is not possible at any time. This is because people can be
wrong about one belief and right about another. Most people are right about their age, phone number, where they live
and work, who they are married too, etc. While confusion may arise occasionally (e.g., remembering one's phone
number) this does not warrant a skeptical stance every time. It only means we need to take care in our conclusions.

 

  1. Brain-in-a-vat argument: It is possible that we are simply brains-in-a-vat and not really living the lives we believe we are living.

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy presents the argument in the following way:
“We are invited to consider the sceptical possibility that our experience is actually produced by a brain
suspended in a life-preserving medium (a vat) and stimulated electrically in such a way as to give us the delusive
experience of living the life with which we are familiar.”2

This argument is based on the use of the logical might; it is logically possible that we are simply brains in a vat.
We are lead to believe that since we might [the logical possibility exists that we might] be brains in a vat (i.e.,
there is no logical contradiction in saying that we are simply brains in a vat hooked up to a computer that is in
putting the images in our minds), then it follows that we might be wrong about everything we believe. Therefore,
we cannot know anything (for everything believed would be false.3

The skeptic believes that with the admission produced by the logical might skepticism is justified and other views
are rendered basically useless. However, this is not the entire story. As noted in the previous section
(1 Argument from error) the converse can be stated, namely, that it is (logically) possible that we do live the
lives we envision. To be fair the skeptic would have to give just as much credence to this possibility as her own.
Thus, there is more of a stalemate involved in this discussion (at this point) than any real defeating of a view.

What needs to happen at this point is to move from the logical might (mere possibility) to the epistemic might (what
view does the evidence best support). In other words, move from the stalemate of both views being possible to
discovering which view has the better support. For instance, of what we know (or think we know), is there any
evidence to suggest that we are brains-in-a-vat? What would such evidence look like? How would we tell if this
was so? While it is still logically possible that we are merely brains-in-a-vat there does not seem to be any evidence
for us to hold to this view even if it is true.

Additionally, there seems to be strong support (intuition, sensory experiences, logic, etc.) that we do, indeed, live
the lives we believe we have. With support for genuine lives and little, if any, evidence for the view that we are
brains-in-a-vat (including the self-refuting nature of the argument), we can safely conclude that we are not
brains-in-a-vat. If we are simply a brain-in-a-vat and everything we believe is an illusion, then thinking that we are
a brain-in-a-vat is an illusion too. Therefore, this view seems to defeat itself. 

  1. Transferring justification: even if we are right about our present experiences that does not mean we are right about
    things outside of our present experiences.

The skeptic could grant that we do know some things: that I am eating breakfast, that there is a computer in
front of me, etc. However, even if we are justified in believing some things, this justification does not transfer
to other beliefs. For instance, I may believe that there is a computer in this room right now (because I am using
it) but that does not mean I would be justified in believing the computer is there an hour after leaving the room
(because someone may have moved it to another room, stolen it, etc.).

However, the problem with this view is that even though a particular conclusion (that the computer is still in this
room an hour after leaving the room) does not necessarily follow from the premise this does not mean that I
cannot know it to be true. For instance, maybe I left the room, locked the door and am the only one with a key.
It is possible that someone broke in and stole the computer or that a demon removed it from the room but
experience does not seem bear this out. Rather, the simpler, more straightforward belief seems most likely
and holds the best support. Therefore, I can be certain that it is true until other evidence comes along to
undermine the belief. Even if such undermining does happen from time to time (there are times when someone
does break into our homes and steal things like computers) we are not justified is holding to this problem on
every belief. Most often the computer remains in the room untouched by either the robber or demon.  

Additionally, the view that we are justified in accepting present experiences is, itself, not an experience. Thus,
this view lacks the necessary support this argument seeks. This claim cannot support itself and is, therefore,
wrong based upon its own standard.

Summary:
At its core, skepticism is, "the refusal to grant that there is any knowledge or justification."4 Skepticism rejects the
idea that truth can be known.5 In other words, skepticism claims that we cannot know anything.

Skepticism's refusal to admit we can know something is especially strong when it comes to truth, God, Scripture, Jesus
Christ and many ethical issues (abortion, monogamy, sexuality, etc.). While claiming to seek truth, skeptics tend to use
questions as a means to hide from it and maintain their own views. This tactic is a distinguishing mark of skeptics as
opposed to the quality pursuit of seeking truth.

Additionally, skeptics confuse "challenging" a view with "rejecting" a view. To challenge a view through asking key questions
is a good approach in discovering truth. But looking for reasons to reject a view without actually pursuing truth
is not an intellectually virtuous approach.


1 Moreland 97-98.
2 "Brain in a vat" The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Oxford Reference Online
. Oxford University Press.  SCELC Biola University.  20 July 2004
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e306>.
3 Remember, in order for a belief to be considered knowledge it must be true. There are other requirements
but being true is one essential requirement. This means anything that is false cannot be knowledge.
4 "Scepticism" The Concise Oxford Companion to English Literature. Ed. Margaret Drabble and Jenny
Stringer. Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  SCELC Biola
University. 27 May 2004
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t54.e5476>.
5 "Scepticism" The Concise Oxford Companion to English Literature. Ed. Margaret Drabble and Jenny
Stringer. Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  SCELC Biola
University. 27 May 2004
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t54.e5476>.